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PAUL A. LEBEL 
A Doctrine By Any Other Name: 
The Putative Rejection of "Crashworthiness" 
in Virginia Products Liability Law 
FEW issues in the modern law of products liabilitv are as 
practically important and yet as conceptually confuscd as how 
to take product mi~use into account when determining if a 
plaintiff Illay recover for a product -related injury. [n sOllle Juris-
dictions, misuse is treated as an affirmative defense. ' while in 
others, a plaintiff must disprove misuse of the product as part 
of the prima facie case. ' Even more troublesome is the varia-
tion among the states reganJing what conduct by a product 
user constitute~ Illi~use. The variables can include such mat-
tlTS as whether the use is one to whieh the product i~ intend-
ed to be put (e.g .. arc all unintended uses "misuses""), whether 
the use is reasonably foreseeable (e.g .. are reasonablv fore-
seeable but unintended uses "misuses," or are they inste;d sim-
ply foreseeable uses?), whether the product has been put to its 
unintended use by the accident victim or a third party (e.g .. 
does thc "misuse'" operate as a plaintift"s conduct dcfense, or 
a~ a matter of whether the product was defective, or as a mat-
ter ofv.·hether the defective condition is a proximate cause of 
the harm"). and whether the use is unreasonably dangerous 
(e.g., docs the viay the product was used have to constitute 
negligence before it is treated as a "misuse')""). 
Funherlllore.the role that product misuse plays in any given 
case depends to a considerable extent on the kind of defec-
tiveness allegation - a manufacturing flaw, a design defect, 
or a failure to instruct and V'iarn adequately - that is bein" 
made. The obligation to uesign a product to he reasonablv saf~ 
when misu~ed in a foreseeable manner can be c1isting~ished 
from the obligation to warn about use in an unintended hut 
foreseeable manner. One might imagine, for instance. a prod-
ucts liability plaintiff being successful in establishing a design 
defect claim that a vehicle should provide greater protection 
in the event of a collision. but !lot being successful in estab-
lishing a marketing defect claim that the manufacturer ~hould 
have warned against letting the vehicle becomc involve:d in a 
collision. 
The strongest lesson that emerges from the product misuse 
cases i~ that the tenninolog:y that courts use can he an unreli-
able guide to the v.'ays that the issues are resolved. In a recent 
case. Slollt! r. (;l'llero{ M%l".I' Corp .. ' the Supreme COll1t of 
Virginia waded into the conceptual thicket of product misuse. 
The Court emerged with a doctrinal position about a product 
manufacturer's design defect liability that is sound as a mat-
ter of buth la",,' and policy. hut that position need~ to be care-
I~ 
fully distinguished from the potentially misleading language 
in which it was announced. 
The plaintiff. Dolor Slone. owned and operated a dump truck 
consisting of a cab and chassi~ manufactured by the defendant 
General Motors Corporation. a dump bed manufactured hv the 
defendant Pontaine Gody & Hoist Comp,my, ,md an ovcrha;"in o 
cab shield manufactured and installed by an unknown p~rt)~ 
'vIr. Slone was injured in an accident that oee:urred at a Virginia 
Department of Transportation depot. where he was dumping a 
load of gravel. Pre-trial discovery about the accident lIIdicated 
that the ground at the edge of a ramp collapsed while the truck 
was still some distance from the edge. causing the truck to uver-
turn in a backwards nip. and serious ly injuring Mr. Slone as 
the cab of the truck was crushed. [[e settled his action against 
an employee of the depot. leaving the products liahilitv claims 
against Gennal Motors and Fontaine. The Circuit CO~r1 grant-
ed the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme 
Court of Virginia unanimously upheld the 'lllnmary judgment 
in favor of Fontaine but, by a 5-2 vote. the Court reverseu the 
summary judgment entered for General Motors and remanded 
the case for further proceedings. 
[n the context of design defectivenes~ litigation regarding 
motor vehicles. a well -establi~hed doctrine of "crashworthi-
ness" requires that the manufacturer's de~ign obligation includes 
taking reasonable etfoI1s to protect a vehicle's occupants \,·'hen 
the vehicle is involved in a collision. If that doctrine were to 
be articulated In the terminology of product misuse, it would 
simply reflect the undeniable re:ality that exp()~ure to the risk 
of collision is an inevitable pan of the environment in which 
vehicles are used, and thus involvement in a collision wou ld 
bc designated as a reasonably foreseeable misuse or thc prod-
uct for which reasonable design measures must be taken. Aftel' 
SOllle initial hesitation.' the inclusion of a crashwonhine:ss de-
ment in ve:hicle manufacturers' uesign obligations has been 
part of the law of products liability in this country for nearl\, 
thirty years. ' ~ 
The Slolle decision purported to reject a crashworthiness 
doctrine for Virginia. Wliting for a maJority of the Coul1, Jus-
Lice Hassell stated that "[ w]e find no reason to confuse our 
well-settled jurisprudence hy injecti ng the doctrine of 'cra~h ­
worthiness' and, therefore , we reject this doctrine. "" If that lan-
guage of the opinion we:r'C taken at face value, it could mean 
that occupants or veh icles involved in collisions were to be 
denied the: benefit of safety precaution~ that reasonable: care 
on the part of manufacturers would require to be bui It into thc 
design of the vehicle~. Fortunately for Virginia consumers. the 
Court's det:ision in SlolI£' actually operates in a much more 
reasonable fa~hion than the crashworthine~s-re.iecting language 
might indicate. 
The quite unrcmarkable position taken by the majority in 
SlolI£' is that a product~ liability plaintiH' mu~t prove that the 
product was "unrcasunably dangerou~ either for the use to 
which litl would ordinari ly be put or for some other reason-
ably fore~eeable purpo~e"" In previous cases. the COUtt said. 
it had "implicitly reco!!niled that a manufacturer rnav be held 
liable for the foreseeable misuse of it~ product. .. · Slo;le makes 
explicit that earlier implicit recognition. but v. ithout qatine: 
that recognition in terms of a requiremcnt that the \Thiclc mu;t 
be reasonahly crashwol1hy. 
One mi&ht rea~onahly ask whether it make~ any difference 
\vhcthl'r the language in which court~ couch their decisions 
corresponds to the practit:al operation uf tho~e decisions. The 
suggestion that it ought to matter t:an be based on a number 
of grounlb. For one thing. thi~ i~ a court that has di~played 
eonsiderahle sensitivity to Iingui~tic preci~ion. ') The notion of 
"crashWOI1hiness" is sufficiently a matter of ordinary language 
meaning - and sufficiently distinguishahle from a notion of 
"crash-proof' - that the COLll1 might have conceded that a 
doctrine under that name is appropliatcly part of the law of 
produch liability in this state. More significantly. perhaps. oth-
ers may rely exclusively on the unqualified language about 
rejecting the crashworthiness doctrine and pay insufficient 
attention to the nuances of the more t:arefully constructed doc-
trine that is at:tually being applied. An c:xample of this latter 
phenomenon occurred at the 199.'i meeting of the American 
La v." Institute. where Virginia was identified during the floor 
dc:bate on the late~t Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts: Product~ Liability as having just rejected crashwor-
thine~~ . That ~tatelllent is literally correct. hut without con-
siLlerable amplification. the statement offers a misleading 
impre~sion of the ~tate of deSign defectiveness litigation i~ 
Virginia . 
The dissenting opinion in SlolIl' offers a redllcfio ad ahslIr-
dllll1 argument against the recognition of a design ohligation 
to make a vehicle rea~onably safe in the event of a collision. 
Justices Compton and Whiting hypothe~i7ed that hecause "a 
truck could he negligently driven into water." a manufacturer 
might he required "to equip the vehicle with pontoons."" In 
the absence of buoyancy being precisely what was demanded 
of a \'Chicle manufacturer. as in the case of the anlled force, 
contracting with a manufacturer 10 produce a vehicle that can 
be driven on land and also tloated across hodies of water. one 
could conclude that an encounter between a vehicle and a hodv 
of \vater is something for which the manufacturer has no desig~ 
ohligation. 
A slight variation of the di~senter~' pontoon example will 
reali~tically illustrate the extent of the reasunable de,i!!n obli<r-
ation that is illlpmed on vehicle manufacturer,. Sup~o~e th:t 
a pal1 icular feature of a I inc: of vehicle~ i~ the ~lIdden and imllle-
diate inoperahility of a scat belt release mechanism when the 
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lllechani~1ll i~ suhlllergc:d in water. It i~. of Ull,,·'e. not I!oinl! 
to be true that the car has to bl' (il:signed ... 0 that it will ~ll'\e-r 
be suhmerged. But could one responsibly ~ugge\l that a rea-
sonable measure would not be demanded a~ part of the design 
obligation to identify and cOlTect this design feature. recog-
nizing that one uf the foreseeable accident \l'enarios or vehi -
cle use i~ the submersion of vehicles in water') 
This illustration al~o supports another important Ies~()11 t:UIl-
cerning contemporary products liahilitv litil!ation. The defec-
tiveness of a product is a nt.:cessary ~lcn;ent in a product~ 
liability claim. but proving defecti\'ene~, i ... in ,u lfi cil'n t to 
impose liability. When the f()CLI~ is on the derel'livene ... ~ of a 
design feature. as it was in SlolI£'. it is illlport;lIlt to understand 
that defectiveness is only one of a number of critic;d elellll'nb 
in litigation that include~ not only thl' rl'st of thl' plaintiff\ 
prima facie case hut also a range uf alTirnJativl' dt.:fen~e~ that 
look at thl' plaintiff's conduct. 
~or one thing. the defect must he causally relatl'd to thl' hann 
in a way that satisfies hoth eause-in-fart and proximatl' GIUSl' 
requirements . Suppose. for example. that thl' occupant of a car 
v;,a, rendered uncon"eious hy an impal't prior to the \chicle 
being submerged, and could not have tried to get thl' scat helt 
unfastened. The inoperahility of tht.: scat helt rclease Il1ccha-
nism would ~till he a produl't design defect. hut in thi, ,cl'nario. 
1-' 
it would be a defect that was not causally related to the harm 
to the occupant. Furthermore, affirmative defenses can come 
into play to reduce or (in this state) to bar a product victim's 
recovery. Even a defect that is a proximate cause of a plain-
tiff's harm would not be the basis of liability if the plaintiff 
was negligent and that negligence was a substantial factor in 
producing the injury. 
An examination of Slone reveals a clear and a limited point. 
The clear point is this: Manufacturers of motor vehicles have 
to take into account the environment in which their products 
will be used, and in a society in which fifty thousand people 
die each year in traffic accidents, that environment unques-
tionably includes involvement in collisions. The limited point 
is this: The design obligation to protect occupants of vehicles 
- whether it is described as crashworthiness or simply as a 
requirement to anticipate reasonably foreseeable misuses -
is to provide only reasonable safety precautions, not to build 
in perfect protection from risks that are highly unlikely to be 
encountered or that are excessively difficult to eliminate. 
Litigating products liability cases with that focus on rea-
sonable protection should not be conceptually difficult in this 
state. Over the last thirty years, while the products liability 
train around the nation has roared off down the tracks of strict 
liability in tort, Virginia has remained on the fault-based tort 
platform . Now, given the reform measures that have been 
adopted by many state legislatures, proposed in Congress, and 
are being written into the latest version of the Restatement of 
Torts, it is evident that the momentum toward strict liability 
has diminished. Indeed, it appears that the strict liability train 
that Virginia refused to board seems to be limping back into 
the fault-based liability station. 
The most important defining characteristic of the newly-
emerging national consensus on design defect determinations 
is that those determinations should consider whether a rea-
sonable alternative design for the product would have elimi-
nated foreseeable risks. " That characteristic of a design defect 
is virtually impossible to distinguish from a determination that 
the product was negligently designed. ' 2 
The decision in Slone simply acknowledges that a legitimate 
issue in a products liability case is whether reasonable care was 
exercised in the design of a vehicle to protect an occupant from 
an unreasonable risk of harm in the event of a reasonably fore -
seeable accident. That is not to say that the cab of this dump 
truck must have been strong enough to withstand the crushing 
14 
force that it was subjected to in this accident - that is a mat-
ter of proof for the plaintiff to offer. iJ It is to say, however, that 
the structural integrity of the cab does not disappear from the 
manufacturer 's design responsibility simply because the truck 
was involved in an unintended flip. The Slone decision is com-
fortably located, historically and conceptually. within this state's 
long-standing refusal to apply strict liability in tort , and is per-
fectly consistent with a commitment to recognizing manufac-
turer liability for culpable design choices. 
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